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Forced Migration F'rom Rwanda: Myths and Realities 
The ongoing Rwandan crisis has been 
attributed to the war between the 
Tutsi-dominated Rwandans in the di- 
aspora and the Hutu-dominated re- 
gime at home. More often than not, the 
conflict has been presented as that be- 
tween the Hutu and the Tutsi. The 
media largely ignored the tens of thou- 
sands of Rwandans killed in massacres 
that antedate the 1990s. The explana- 
tion of the crisis in terms of the repres- 
sion of the Tutsi by the regime in Kigali 
(whose power structure is mainly 
Hutu) is similarly flawed. The charac- 
terization of the French intervention in 
Rwanda as a "humanitarian" venture 
is yet another myth. Consistent sup- 
port by Belgium and France strength- 
ened the Habyarimana regime and 
made it inflexible at the Arusha peace 
talks, which aimed at restoring democ- 
racy in Rwanda. Even though the hor- 
rors of the Rwandan genocide have 
now clothed the French involvement 
with an aura of "do-gooder," the origi- 
nal French intervention was a case of 
the Imperial Twitch (Elliott 1994, 17). 
Realities 
This paper will argue that the crisis in 
Rwanda is the culmination of a deep- 
seated antagonism arising out of local, 
national, and international conjunc- 
ture of factors. They include, among 
others, the colonial policies of Ger- 
many and Belgium, the lethargic re- 
sponse of the United Nations, the 
activities of France and Belgium in the 
post-colonial period, the regional poli- 
cies of President Habyarimana, and 
the "Khaki Factor" in African politics. 
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Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and 
Cyprian Ntaryamira of Burundi con- 
stituted the spark which set off this 
powder keg. 
Colonial Legacy 
The colonial policies of Germany and 
Belgium contributed to the Rwandan 
crisis. Changes that occurred in the 
colonial period eroded the legitimacy 
of Tutsi rulers. Furthermore, the 
spread of new ideas has also been cited 
as the raison d'etreof the 1959-61 "revo- 
lution" which impacted on the 
Rwandan political system and, by ex- 
tension, on the current crises (Maquet 
and d'Hertefelt, 1959). This functional- 
ist paradigm was basedon the premise 
of a static, traditional polity in which 
the Hutu had been dominated by state 
structures from the pre-19th century 
period (Newbury 1992, 5). Unfortu- 
nately, it does not take into considera- 
tion changes over time and falls short 
of a holistic explanation. 
Rwanda was under two different 
colonial regimes. The Germans ruled 
Rwanda from 1898-1914 and the Bel- 
gians took over from 1916-61. Both 
colonial regimes identified with and 
ruled through the Tutsi nobility 
(Newbury 1988,3; 1992,194). Until the 
1940s, the Belgians educated the Tutsi, 
but not the Hutu, and replaced Hutu 
chiefs with the Tutsi (Zolberg et al. 
1989). 
Under Belgium, the monarchy was 
abolished and the Hutu hegemony re- 
placed that of the Tutsi (Newbury 
1988). The Rwandan power nexus was 
significantly influenced by non- 
Rwandan institutions, such as the 
Catholic church and the Belgian ad- 
ministration, and this impacted on the 
post-colonial political situation. The 
altered political situation and the 
means by which it was brought about 
sowed the seeds for potential conflict. 
The colonial state transformed a hi- 
erarchical, flexible system into a rigid, 
bureaucratic one that exacerbated eth- 
nic divisions (Zolberg et al. 1989). 
Thus, Belgian colonial policy en- 
hanced the coercive and extractive 
powers of the state controlled by cer- 
tain dominant lineages, and thereby 
widened the gap between the Tutsi 
office holders and the mostly, but not 
exclusively, Hutu non-office holders 
(Zolberg et al. 1989; C. Watson 1991). 
Aloysius Mugabo, a Tutsi refugee in 
Uganda, summed up Belgian policy: 
The Belgian offered educational op- 
portunities only to us . . . They told 
the Hutu that priority was given to 
the Tutsi. Then in the end, they said 
to the Hutu: "You see what the Tutsi 
are doing? They are getting the best 
jobs." . . . They did this to create con- 
flict between us. (C. Watson 1991) 
The colonial administration 
adopted the classic divide-and-rule. 
policy of European imperialism in Af- 
rica (Duignan and Gann 1969). The co- 
lonial demands for labour and taxes 
and obligatory cultivation of the 1950s 
that were enforced by the chiefs and, to 
some extent, by the Tutsi (though not 
all Tutsi became rich and powerful), 
made a lasting and unforgettable im- 
pression on the Hutu (Pakenham 1991; 
Newbury 1992,193). 
The most hated aspect of Belgian 
rule was forced labour: 
In 1932, an elderly missionary com- 
plained that the authorities had req- 
uisitioned his parishioners so often 
they scarcely had time to grow food, 
and famine threatened. There was, 
he complained, the coffee drive, the 
buckwheat drive, tree planting, con- 
struction work, road cleaning and 
more ... elderly Tutsi refugees in 
Uganda recall massive terracing 
schemes and road projects, and say 
Tutsi overseers were often required 
to force Hutu to work. "If you didn't 
meet your targets, the Belgians 
would whip you . . . They said, 'You 
whip the Hutu or we will whip you.'" 
(C. Watson 1991,4) 
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In effect, colonialism was an instru- 
ment which destroyed the social and 
political culture of Rwandese society 
by fundamentally transforming the 
political institutions. It also destroyed 
the traditional institution of divine 
kingship of the Mwami which, by giv- 
ing cohesion to the diverse groups, 
served to minimize ethnic tension. In 
the final analysis, the contradictions of 
colonial rule laid the basis for the ensu- 
ing massacres, the refugee crises, and 
the present carnage in Rwanda. 
The distrust sown between the two 
groups by colonial favouritism and 
exploitation, coupled with the machi- 
nations of the Catholic church, ex- 
ploded in civil war after the abolition 
of the monarchy and the installation of 
a civilian republican government. The 
1959 "revolution," led by the Hutu, 
overthrew the highly centralized mon- 
archy that had ruled Rwanda up to the 
colonial period (Newbury 1992, 193). 
The formation of Le Parti du 
Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu 
(PARMEHUTU) in 1959, which 
adopted a pro-Hutu, anti-Tutsi plat- 
form, was one of the numerous meth- 
ods aimed at addressing the 
contradictions which had existed in 
Rwanda (Newbury 1992,196; Mazrui 
and Rotberg, 1970,896). In November 
of the same year, the Association pour 
la Promotion Sociale de la Masse 
(APROSOMA) was launched by 
Joseph Gitera (Mazrui and Rotberg 
1970,898). 
The latent antagonism, which had 
also been fostered by the Catholic 
church, culminated in violence near 
Gitarama in central Rwanda and other 
parts of the country in November 1959. 
Thousands of Tutsi huts were set 
aflame. According to the UN Visiting 
Mission, "the incendiaries set off in 
bands of ten. Armed with machetes 
and paraffin, which indigenous inhab- 
itants use in large quantities for their 
lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses 
they passed on their way and set fire to 
them" (U.N. Visiting Mission, 78; 
Mazrui and Rotberg 1970,904). These 
acts of violence had a millenerian cliar- 
acter (Hobsbawm 1971). The Belgian 
administration changed sides and sup- 
ported the Hutu and, from 1960 on- 
wards, the Hutu began to gain promi- 
nent positions in Rwanda. Thus, "the 
events of Gitarama carried to its penul- 
timate state the social and political 
revolution which had begun in late 
1959" (Mazrui and Rotberg, 879). Its 
origins lay in the inequities of the so- 
cial and political order and aimed at an 
irreversible shift in relations between 
the ruler and the ruled (Mazrui and 
Rotberg, 880; Maquet, 160). By the time 
of independence in 1962, Tutsi author- 
ity had been broken. The Tutsi fled the 
country by the thousand and, by 1962, 
250,000 Tutsi left Rwanda (Newbury 
1992, 197). Seven thousand were in- 
stalled at the Nyambata camp for refu- 
gees, and 15,000 were distributed 
throughout the Bymba, Kisenyi, and 
Bantu language of Kinyarwanda and 
share basically the same culture. In the 
words of Faustin Twagiramungu: "We 
are the luckiest people in Africa. We 
have the same language, the same reli- 
gion-traditional religion, at least. No 
dance or song is particular to either 
Tutsis or Hutus" (The Guardian Weekly 
1994). Anthropologists debate about 
whether these groups are castes or 
classes. The general consensus is, how- 
ever, that a hierarchy existed between 
them. All the same, cognizance should 
be taken of the fact that social mobility 
and intermarriage blurred the "caste" 
distinction. A Hutu who was made a 
chief could become a Tutsi through 
"kwihutura" (shedding Hutuness). 
Conversely, a Tutsi family could lose 
its cattle, become farmers, and eventu- 
Anthropologists debate about whether these groups are castes or 
classes. The general consensus is, however, that a hierarchy existed 
between them. All the same, cognizance should be taken of the fact 
that social mobility and intermarriage blurred the "caste" distinction. 
Astrida districts (Mazrui and Rotberg 
1970, 909; C. Watson 1991, 2). Conse- 
quently, the Belgians appointed Hutu 
chiefs and subchiefs to occupy the 
posts which had been vacated (Mazrui 
and Rotberg 1970,909). Thus, up to the 
end of their mandate, the Belgians ac- 
celerated the "revolutionary" forces 
which unleashed terror in Rwanda. 
Ethnic Conflict 
The conflict has also been portrayed as 
an ethnic civil war between the Rwan- 
dese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the 
Kigali regime. In the Kigali massacres, 
however, government troops and mi- 
litias eliminated all moderate Hutu 
political opposition and attempted to 
erase the Tutsi population from the 
political map of Rwanda. The term 
"ethnic conflict," therefore, fails to cap- 
ture what is now considered a geno- 
cide (Beresford 1994). A thorough 
understanding of the conflict must 
take into consideration Rwanda's past 
(Maquet 1961). The Banyarwanda 
(East Africa's largest ethnic group 
made up of 12 million, of whom 7.3 
million live in Rwanda) all speak the 
ally become Hutu (C. Watson 1991). 
The ethnicity argument is also uncon- 
vincing in view of the fact that some 
Hutu nobility saved their Tutsi friends 
and neighbours, and the first casual- 
ties of the pogrom turned out to be the 
Hutu (Beresford 1994). More impor- 
tantly, confusion, misunderstanding, 
and misinterpretation characterize the 
treatment and group definitions of 
people by travellers, explorers, trad- 
ers, European colonial administrators, 
geographers, and anthropologists. 
Ethnicity should be located clearly in 
time and space, and ethnic groups' tan- 
gled and often ludicrous histories 
should be traced (Southall 1985, 567; 
Amselle and MIBokolo 1985). 
The explanation of the crisis in terms 
of repression of the Tutsiby the regime 
in Kigali (whose power is mainly 
Hutu) does not capture the entire pic- 
ture. In reality, both Hutu and Tutsi 
were at the mercy of a regional clique 
which repressed all of them. The geno- 
cide in Rwanda is rather the work of 
escadron de la mort who were armedand 
trained by Belgian and French merce- 
naries (Rwandese Review 1992). 
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The Role of the Leadership 
The leadership of Rwanda since inde- 
pendence shares part of the blame for 
the current crisis. Their failure to live 
above ethnic, regional, and group dif- 
ferences fed into an already existing 
atmosphere of hate and enmity. The 
regionalism and favouritism of the 
first Hutu president, Kayibanda (his 
government was dominated by people 
from central Rwanda), provoked re- 
gional tensions and culminated in the 
coup of 1973 (Newbury 1992, 198). 
Gregoire Kayibanda was overthrown 
in a bloodless coup d'etat on July 5, 
1973 by Major-General Juvenal 
Habyarimana. Habyarimana, a Hutu 
aristocrat and former army chief of 
staff, cited the failure to deal with tribal 
politics as one of the reasons for the 
coup d'etat. In 1988, he was re-elected 
for a third five-year term as the unop- 
posed presidential candidate. 
However, Habyarimana and his 
clique proved no different from their 
predecessor (Africa Confidential, 1994 
May). His politics of regionalism fa- 
voured the north, distorted develop- 
ment, and created a backlash of 
discontent. More importantly, his re- 
sistance to the repatriation of 
Rwandese exiles from Uganda, Tanza- 
nia, and Burundi culminated in the 
RPF drive to "come back home" 
(Adelman and Sorenson 1994, 143). 
In addition, repression at home by 
the Habyarimana regime heightened 
tensions. According to Kayitare, secu- 
rity and safety for Tutsi students 
deteriorated from 1973 onwards. 
There was systematic harassment of 
Tutsi women who, in the absence of 
protection from University security 
personnel, called upon their male col- 
leagues for support. Names of Tutsi 
students were posted at the entrances 
to buildings and they were enjoined to 
leave or face the consequences, i.e. 
physical violence (Murunganwa 1989, 
10; Afica Confidential 1994 Aug). Un- 
like the repression of the 1960s, this one 
was aimed at specific groups-the 
educated, students, and those in 
skilled and semiskilled positions 
(Murunganwa 1989,12). 
In Uganda, the Banyarwanda fared 
badly between 1980 and 1985. The sec- 
ond Obote regime persecuted the 
Banyarwanda because they were 
"cousins" of Yoweri Museveni's eth- 
nic group, the Banyankole, and ex- 
pelled 40,000 of them in 1982 (C. 
Watson 1992,53). Even though Tanza- 
nia offered citizenship to the 36,000 
Banyarwandan refugees, less that 
5,000 completed the costly paperwork 
and, in March 1990, Tanzania began to 
expel the 40,000 Rwandan migrants, 
mostly Hutu. In Zaire, Kinyarwanda 
speakers were classified as foreign and 
denied political rights (Watson 1992, 
53). Thus, exile was harsh enough to 
drive some of them into RPF ranks. 
In January 1991, the Rwandan Patri- 
otic Front overrun the northwestern 
Rwandan district of Ruhengeri and 
released all political prisoners. This 
daring attack forced French Marines 
(stationed in Rwanda since the Octo- 
ber 1990 invasion) to evacuate French, 
Belgian, and German nationals from 
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (Africa Events 
1991). Despite the infusion of French 
paratroopers from Calvi, Corsica, the 
RPF offensive continued, prompting 
Habyarimana to call a ceasefire on Feb- 
ruary 16,1991 and to agree to a regional 
summit. The summit brought together 
Ali Hasan Mwinyi of Tanzania, 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Pierre 
Buyoya of Burundi, and Lunda Bululu 
(prime minister) of Zaire in Dar es Sa- 
laam. Here, Habyarimana, for once, 
expressed willingness to resettle refu- 
gees wishing to return home (C. 
Watson 1992,53). He also offered gen- 
eral amnesty to all "rebels" who sur- 
rendered (Africa Events 1991). The RPF, 
however, rejected the ceasefire be- 
cause they realized that the expansion 
of the fighting over the whole of north- 
ern Rwanda, rather than a spirit of 
compromise, occasioned the shift in 
Habyarimana's policies. Therefore, 
they wanted to take advantage of the 
momentum and bargain from a posi- 
tion of strength (Sunday Standard, 
1989). The Habyarimana government 
responded to the invasion by giving 
carte blanche to troops and militia to 
massacre innocent civilians. Tutsi, 
identified by their appearance and 
idehtity cards, were detained by sol- 
diers and thrown into overcrowded 
police stations, jails, or football stadi- 
ums. Hundreds of children and the 
elderly perished in these conditions 
(New African 1990,ll; Amnesty Interna- 
tional Report 1992,223). Thousands of 
people fled the massacres and, within 
two weeks, 4,000 refugees had arrived 
at the border point in Kizinga. Refu- 
gees talked about government troops 
moving from village to village with 
lists of Tutsi to be executed. However, 
not only Tutsi were killed. Hutus sus- 
pected of collaborating with the rebels 
were likewise killed (New African 1990, 
11). 
Several summits, which aimed at 
finding solutions to the conflict be- 
tween 1991 and 1994, produced few 
results due to the lack of commitment 
on the part of Habyarimana and the 
preoccupation of Mobutu Sese Seko 
with his own problems. On March 14, 
1991, the Habyarimana government 
and the representatives of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front met in Kin- 
shasa, Zaire, to formalize the ceasefire. 
The position of the RPF at the talks was: 
an end to the discrimination against 
the Tutsi and the Twa minorities, a re- 
dress of regional imbalances, an im- 
provement in human rights, and a 
clampdown on corruption and wide- 
spread abuse by the ruling Hutu clique 
(Africa Events 1991,ll). The RPF objec- 
tive was the dismantling of the current 
institutions of dictatorship to enable 
the country to start on a new demo- 
cratic path. However, talks on an all- 
party transitional government to end 
up the fighting ended nowhere. 
The 1992 Amnesty International Re- 
port summed up the Rwandan situa- 
tion thus: 
Several thousand political detainees 
were held without trial until April 
when most were released. Dozens of 
members of the minority Tutsi ethnic 
group ... were arrested ... There 
were reports of torture, and "disap- 
pearances." Hundreds of extrajudi- 
cia1 executions by members of the 
security forces and vigilante groups 
were reported (Amnesty International 
1992,223). 
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According to the report, the Constitu- 
tion was amended in June to introduce 
a multi-party (in place of the one- 
party) state and elections were sched- 
uled for 1992. Unfortunately, several 
deadlines passed without any concrete 
attempt to implement the peace and 
constitutional plan. 
In February 1994, President 
Habyarimana made a feeble effort to 
halt the Rwandan crisis by swearingin 
a transitional government. Four of the 
five parties involved refused to show 
up for the swearing-in ceremony be- 
cause they were not satisfied with their 
promised share of power (P. Watson 
1994; Beresford 1994,23). Thus, for the 
fourth straight time, attempts to set up 
a multi-party government to rule till 
elections came to nought. 
The shooting down of the plane car- 
rying Presidents Habyarimana and 
Ntaryamira was the immediate cause 
of the massacres which were to reach 
genocidal proportions. In the second 
week of April 1994, extremist Hutus 
with machetes and guns murdered 
some 1,180 Tutsis at a church in 
Rwanda (Toronto Star 1994 April 16). 
Rampaging troops killed Rwandan 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyi- 
mana who had sought refuge in the 
UN compound (Toronto Star 1994 April 
8, Al; April 9, A12). As the slaughter 
got underway, the RPF began to drive 
the Hutu-dominated army and militia 
towards the south. In May, most of 
Rwanda's government fled south in 
the wake of the RPF onslaught. The 
self-declared government, set up after 
the death of Habyarimana, fled &om 
Kigali to Gitarama a week later (To- 
ronto Star 1994 May 30, A12 ). 
Many refugees were driven by the 
RPFvidory and the worsening conflict 
between the Tutsi and the Hutu to 
Burundi in the south. Of those who 
survived the genocide, at least 2.2 mil- 
lion people are reported to have fled 
the country. In 5 days, a million Hutu 
refugees poured into Goma, Zaire. In 
camps across the eastern border with 
Tanzania and across the southern bor- 
der in Burundi, hundreds of thousands 
of Hutu and Tutsi refugees languish 
(Gibbs 1994,21). Hate radio broadcasts 
by hardline Hutu spread hysteria 
among refugees, telling them that the 
new rulers would butcher them in re- 
prisal and that they would thus be bet- 
ter off staying in the refugee camps 
(Brittain 1994; for an extended discus- 
sion of the French involvement in the 
Rwandan crisis, see Woldu and Abaka, 
infra) . 
The reasons behind the genocide in 
Rwanda and the forced migration of 
over two million people have often 
been couched in terms of ethnic clashes 
and the repression of the Tutsi by the 
Kigali regime. However, a careful 
analysis of the crisis shows that Ger- 
man and Belgian colonial policies, the 
activities of France and her allies, the 
failure torepatriate the Rwandese who 
had beenforced out of the country, and 
the regionalism of Habyarimana and 
his ruling clique are the root causes. It 
is very important in the Rwandan 
question to recognize the fact that a 
person does not transmit refugee sta- 
tus to his child, grandchild, or great 
grandchild. 
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